Email spoofing is a critical step of phishing, where the attacker impersonates someone the victim knows or trusts. In this paper, we conduct a qualitative study to explore why email spoofing is still possible after years of efforts to develop and deploy anti-spoofing protocols (e.g., SPF, DKIM, DMARC). First, we measure the protocol adoption by scanning 1 million Internet domains. We find the adoption rates are still low, especially for the new DMARC (3.1%). Second, to understand the reasons behind the low-adoption rate, we collect 4293 discussion threads (25.7K messages) from the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), a working group formed to develop and promote Internet standards. Our analysis shows key security and usability limitations in the protocol design, which makes it difficult to generate a positive "net effect" for a wide adoption. We validate our results by interviewing email administrators and discuss key implications to future anti-spoofing solutions.
INTRODUCTION
Phishing attack is a known threat to the Internet. This threat has escalated significantly today due to the heavy involvement of phishing attacks in recent data breaches [44] , ransomware outbreaks [30] , and even political campaigns [13] . For example, email phishing has involved in nearly half of the 2000 reported breaches in 2016, responsible for leaking billions of data records [44] .
Email spoofing is a critical step in phishing attacks where the attacker impersonates someone that the victim knows or trusts. By spoofing the email address of a reputable organization or a close friend, the attacker has a better chance to deceive the victim [20] . To prevent spoofing, there has been an active effort since early 2000 to develop, promote, and deploy antispoofing protocols. Protocols such as SPF [24] , DKIM [8] , and DMARC [29] have become the Internet standards, allowing email receivers to verify the sender's identity.
Despite these efforts, however, sending spoofing emails is still surprisingly easy today. As an example, Figure 1 shows a spoofing email where the sender address is set as the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). We crafted and sent this email to our own account in Yahoo (as the victim), and it successfully reached the inbox without triggering any warnings. This is not a coincident as email spoofing is still widely used in real-world phishing attacks [44, 35, 13] .
The real question is, why email spoofing is still possible after years of efforts spent on the defense. In 2015, two measurement studies shed some lights [12, 17] , where the result Figure 1 . A spoofing email that impersonates the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). We acted as the attacker and sent this email to our own account. The email arrived the inbox without triggering any alert (Mr. Hu is a fictional name).
shows a relatively low adoption rate of anti-spoofing protocols. Among Alexa top 1 million domains, only 40% have adopted SPF and only 1% have DMARC. In 2017, we perform our own measurement as a pilot study and found that the adoption rates were still low (SPF 45.8%, DMARC 3.1%). However, it is not yet clear what causes the slow progress of adopting anti-spoofing solutions.
In this paper, we perform a qualitative study to understand why anti-spoofing protocols are not widely adopted. We first tried to interview email service providers, which turned out to be very difficult to realize. Part of the reason is that the candidate pool is small. People who can provide insights to our questions need to have real-world experience managing email services. In addition, email administrators often hesitate (or are not allowed) to share details about their anti-phishing/spoofing solutions, especially those working in major companies and organizations.
To solve these challenges, we follow a hybrid method combining empirical data analysis with small-scale but in-depth interviews. First, we focus on the protocol designers to understand the technical limitations of these protocols that are likely to create adoption barriers. We collect the public discussion threads from The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), a working group formed to develop and standardize SPF, DKIM, and DMARC. By coding their discussions (4293 threads, 25.7K messages), we extract and categorize key usability and security issues in the protocol design. Second, we recruit two experienced email administrators from our local institution to conduct in-depth interviews. Although only two email administrators are interviewed, we obtain new insights from the protocol adopters' perspectives.
• First, we extract and categorize the security and usability problems rooted in the protocol design by mining the IETF discussion threads. Flaws in SPF and DKIM may allow certain spoofing emails to bypass the authentication or mis-flag legitimate emails sent by mailing lists and mail forwarding. DMARC helps to resolve some of the issues but new problems emerge. These technical problems negatively impact the perceived usefulness of these protocols.
• Second, there is a lack of a "critical mass" to bootstrap a wide adoption. As network protocols, SPF, DKIM and DMARC have little value unless a large number of Internet domains adopt the protocol. Our result suggests that email providers tend to wait for other people to get on board before making an adoption decision, making it challenging to bootstrap the adoption.
• Third, the costs and benefits for protocol adopters are unbalanced, particularly for non-email domains. Domain owners are less motivated to publish their SPF/DKIM/DMARC records, since it primarily helps other email services to authenticate emails, but has limited benefits for themselves.
Our results raise key concerns about the current defense against spoofing attacks. We hope these findings can help researchers, email providers and policymakers to make more informed decisions to improve the situation. Moving forward, we argue that the technical issues in the protocol design need to be addressed, and external enforcement/incentives (e.g., from policymakers) are also needed to bootstrap the protocol adoption.
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
We start by describing the email spoofing attack and existing anti-spoofing protocols. Then, we introduce related technology adoption theories to set up the contexts for our study.
SMTP and Email Spoofing
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) is the Internet standard for email transmission [36] . Figure 2 shows a typical email transmission process. A key limitation of SMTP is that it has no built-in security features to prevent people (attackers) from impersonating/spoofing an arbitrary sender address.
To perform a spoofing attack, attackers can manipulate two key fields to send emails. First, after establishing an SMTP connection in step , the attacker can use the "MAIL FROM" command and set the sender address to anyone that they want to impersonate. After that, the "MAIL FROM" address is inserted into the header as the "Return-Path". In addition, attackers can modify another field called "From" in the email header. This "From" field specifies the address that will be displayed on the email interface [39] . When a user receives the email, the user will see the "From" address (e.g., visa@uscis.gov in Figure 1 ). If the user replies the email, the reply message will go to the "Return-Path" set by "MAIL FROM". Note that the two addresses are not always the same.
Email spoofing is a critical step of phishing attacks to gain the victim's trust [38, 19, 20] . Meanwhile, spoofing is also a strong signal of phishing attacks [19, 25, 26, 31, 37] . Spoofing detection results are often used by phishing detection systems [9, 11, 15, 18, 40] . 
Anti-Spoofing Protocols
To detect and prevent email spoofing, SMTP extension protocols are proposed including SPF, DKIM and DMARC. All three protocols have been published or standardized by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF).
SPF. Sender Policy Framework (SPF) was proposed in early 2000, and standardized in 2014 [24] . SPF allows a domain to publish a list of IPs that are authorized to send emails on its behalf. For instance, the domain a.com can publish its SPF record in the DNS. When the receiving server receives the MAIL FROM command claiming to be alex@a.com, the receiving server can check if the sender IP is listed in the SPF record of a.com.
DKIM.
DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) was first drafted in 2004 and standardized in 2011 [8] . DKIM uses a public-key based approach to authenticate the email sender and check the email integrity. More specifically, the sender's email service will place a digital signature in the email header signed by the private key associated with the sender's domain. The receiving service can retrieve the sender's public key from DNS to verify the signature. To retrieve a DKIM public key from DNS, one will need the selector information (an attribute in the DKIM signature beside the domain name. By verifying the DKIM signature, the receiver can detect if the signed message has been modified, to ensure integrity and authenticity.
DMARC.
Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance (DMARC) was drafted in 2011 and published in 2015 [29] . DMARC is not a standalone protocol but needs to work with SPF and/or DKIM. DMARC allows the domain owner to publish a "failing policy" which specifies what actions the receiver should take when the incoming email fails the DMARC checks. In addition, DMARC requires identifier alignment from SPF or DKIM. For SPF, alignment means that MAIL FROM address used for the SPF check should be consistent with the From field in the header. For DKIM, alignment means that the domain name in the DKIM signature should match the From field. Alignment ensures the email address that user sees matches with the authenticated address.
The Low Adoption Rates of Anti-spoofing Protocols
In 2015, two measurement studies have shown that antispoofing protocols were not widely used among Internet domains [12, 17] . Among Alexa top 1 million domains [3] , only 40% of the domains have published an SPF record and 1% have a DMARC record.
In January 2017, we conducted our own measurements as a pilot study to examine the recent adoption rates for SPF and DMARC. Just like [12, 17] , our measurement did not apply to DKIM since querying the DKIM records requires the selector for each domain (non-public information). We will infer the DKIM usage from the DMARC statistics. As shown in Table 1 , the adoption rates are still low compared with two years ago: in 2017, 45.8% of the domains published a valid SPF record and 3.1% have a valid DMARC record. In addition, a significant number of domains have made configuration errors for both SPF and DMARC. Table 1 shows that even fewer domains specify a strict "reject" policy. A strict policy means the receiver is instructed to reject the email when the authenticate fails. 1 We find only 11.8% of the domains set "hard fail" for SPF, and 0.4% set "reject" for DMARC. Recall that DKIM relies on DMARC to publish its policies. The fact that only 3.1% of the domains have a valid DMARC record (0.4% has a "reject" policy) indicates that most DKIM adopters also did not specify a strict policy.
Our measurement result raises serious concerns about the effectiveness of the current spoofing defense. We are motivated to further explore the reasons behind the low adoption rates of anti-spoofing protocols.
Technology Adoption Theories
To provide the contexts for our study, we now introduce key theories for technology adoption [34, 28, 22, 23] . With a focus on network and security protocols, prior works have examined the adoption of DNSSEC [6] , IPv6 [7] , HTTPS [14] , Bitcoin [5] , and Biometric tracking [2] . Below, we discuss three adoption theories related to our study.
TAM.
Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) is the most basic theory that models user intention to adopt new technologies [43, 42] . The model describes the key factors that influence user decision, the most important of which are perceived usefulness (PU) and perceived ease-of-use (PEOU). In our context, "users" refer to email services. TAM has many extended versions with more factors added to the model (e.g., self-efficacy, quality of the system) [27, 43, 10, 32] .
Network Externalities.
For network protocols, the standard TAM is usually not sufficient to explain their adoption since individual user's decision is likely to affect other users. This leads to the notion of Network Externalities (or net effect) [22, 5] . Network externalities mean that an individual adopter can add the value for other people to adopt the same technology. In other words, when more users adopt the same protocol, the value of the protocol to each user will also increase [41] . For anti-spoofing protocols, if more domains publish their SPF/DKIM/DMARC records, it makes easier for other email providers to detect spoofing emails.
Cost-Benefit Model.
Ozment and Schechter propose an adoption model that focuses on the cost-benefit perspective [33] . The model argues that only when the benefits to individual adopters overweight the adoption costs will the protocol be widely accepted. For network protocols, the per-user benefits may grow as more users adopt the protocol (net effect) [1] . The costs can be either constant or changing (mostly decreasing) as more users adopt the protocol.
Often cases, a network protocol requires a minimal level of deployment before creating enough benefits to overweight the costs. This leading to notions of critical mass which represents the minimal number of adopters in order to facilitate selfsustaining adoption or create further growth [41] .
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY
In this paper, we conduct an exploratory study to understand the adoption of anti-spoofing protocols. We qualitatively look into two key questions. First, what are the reasons behind the relatively low rate of anti-spoofing protocols? Second, why did most domain owners configure the protocol with relaxed failing policies?
To answer these questions, we first tested the stand method (i.e., interviewing email administrators), and found it challenging to execute in practice. First, our candidates need to have real-world experience developing or deploying antispoofing protocols. This narrows down the candidate pool to a small, highly specialized user population. Second, email administrators are often reluctant to participate due to the sensitivity of the topic. For many companies and organizations, details about their phishing/spoofing detection systems are non-disclosable. Even if the administrators agree to discuss related topics, it would require additional approval from their supervisors. In our pilot study, we contacted the administrators of Alexa top 4000 domains for a user study request and asked about the level of details of their experience that can be shared. We received 7 responses (0.175% return rate), who can only talk about the generic issues but cannot get into details. We decided not to use this method.
Instead, we conduct our study using a hybrid approach, combining empirical data analysis with small-scale in-depth interviews. First, we focus on the working groups from The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), responsible for developing and promoting Internet standards including SPF, DKIM, and DMARC. IETF maintains a public discussion board for each protocol where members of the working group discuss problems of these protocols. By coding and analyzing their conversation threads, we seek to identify potential limitations in the protocol design that cause their low-adoption rates. This step seeks to obtain insights from protocol designers' perspectives. Second, we recruit two email administrators from our local institution to conduct in-depth interviews. After obtaining the approval from IRB and their supervisors, we ask questions about the practical challenges in deploying and configuring these protocols. This step seeks to provide insights from protocol adopters' perspectives. First, we analyze the discussion threads collected from IETF to understand the perceived value and limitations of SPF, DKIM and DMARC from the protocol designers' perspectives.
Dataset.
We collect the complete historical discussion threads for SPF, DKIM and DMARC from the IETF archive. The overall statistics are shown in Table 2 . In total, we have 4,293 discussion threads and 25,686 messages from 410 discussion participants.
Coding Method.
Our goal is to extract high-level themes regarding each protocol's limitations. We first tried topic modeling (Latent Dirichlet Allocation, or LDA [4] ), seeking to obtain the "clusters" of topics for the discussion threads. However, we find that the clusters produced by LDA are highly noisy, which are barely usable for our purpose.
Instead of using LDA, we decide to manually code the discussion threads into high-level themes following the open coding method [16] . We mix all the discussion threads from the three discussion boards before the coding. This is because the topics from different boards are often related. For example, many discussion threads under DMARC are addressing the problems of SPF. We mark out the discussion threads that are related to the technical problems of these protocols. Then, we code the text and cluster them into high-level themes. These steps are executed by two authors independently. A third author resolves the conflicts in their results.
Step 2: Interview Second, we interview two email administrators from our local institution to examine the protocol adopters' perceptions. One administrator operates the campus email system, and the other one runs a department-level email service (two services are independent). Both interviewees have over 10 years of experience operating email services. The small number of interviewees (from a single institution) is a clear limitation. This is due to the difficulty to recruit email administrators from other organizations and receive the approval for in-depth discussions. Even so, the two interviews have provided useful qualitative results to understand the perceived value and limitations of anti-spoofing protocols.
Our interview is semi-structured, primarily to discuss the email administrators' personal experience of deploying and configuring the anti-spoofing protocols. We have face-to-face interview sessions with a total length of 45 to 60 minutes. First, we discuss the value of the anti-spoofing protocols and the challenges to deploy them in practice. Then, we discuss how email services and domain owners usually make their decisions to use the protocol. Finally, we discuss the possible solutions to Figure 3 . SPF: SPF test is based on the domain of "Return-Path", which can be different from the domain that the user sees (the "From" field). Figure 4 . DKIM: the domain used to sign the email can be different from the domain displayed to users (the "From" field).
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email spoofing beyond the anti-spoofing protocols. We took audio recordings with their informed consent.
Our study is approved by IRB. We ensure that all the data are properly anonymized and securely stored. In the following, we report the detailed results and findings
RESULT: IETF DISCUSSION THREADS
By applying the coding methodology to the IETF dataset, we obtain the results shown in Table 3 . For each protocol, we categorize and summarize the key limitations in the protocol design discussed by IETF working groups. In the following, we briefly describe each of the coded themes and discuss the implications to the protocol adoption in practice.
Usability Problems of SPF and DKIM
SPF and DKIM both have usability problems (P1 and P4) related to "identifier alignment". It means that the sender email address that user sees can be different from the address that is actually used to do perform authentication. Figure 3 and Figure 4 show how attackers can exploit this vulnerability to bypass SPF and DKIM while still spoofing visa@uscis.gov.
For SPF, the authentication focuses on the "Return-Path" and examines whether the sender's IP is listed in the "Return-Path" domain's SPF record. In Figure 3 , the attacker can set the "Return-Path" domain as attacker.com. Since the attacker has a full control over attacker.com, she can add the IP to the SPF record to pass the authentication. However, what the receiving user sees on the email interface is visa@uscis.gov set by the "From" field.
DKIM has a similar problem. DKIM authenticate emails by verifying the signature signed by the domain in the "d=" field. In Figure 4 , the attacker uses her own domain attacker.com to sign the message, which will pass the DKIM check. However, users will see a different sender address on the email interface set by the "From" field. Table 3 . Usability and security problems of SPF, DKIM and DMARC. We cluster the IETF discussion threads into different "problems" (P1-P5). P6 of DKIM is by design, which is listed here for completeness.
As shown in Table 3 , DMARC+SPF or DMARC+DKIM mitigate the problem by enforcing the alignment of the authenticated address and the address that is displayed to users. The problem is that DMARC has not been widely adopted yet (3.1% of the domains, Table 1 ).
Security Problems of SPF
SPF also has security problems that will make legitimate emails fail the authentication (P2 and P3).
P2. Mail Forwarding.
Mail forwarding means one email service automatically forwards emails to another email service. A common scenario is that university students often configure their university email service to forward all their emails to Outlook or Gmail. 2 SPF will fail after mail forwarding because the forwarder's IP will not match the original sender's SPF record. For example, a user configures her email service A is to automatically forward emails to service B. When one of her emails is sent by C to A, this email will be automatically forwarded to B but the "Return-Path" still points to C. When B performs the SPF check, it will fail because A's IP will not match with C's SPF record.
P3. Mailing List.
When a message is sent to a mailing list, the mailing list will "broadcast" the message to all the subscribers. This is a similar process as mail forwarding. During this process, the mailing list's IP will become the sender IP, which is different from the original sender's IP. This will leads to SPF failure.
To avoid SPF failures for mail forwarding (or mailing list), one possible approach is to change the "Return-Path" to the forwarder's domain. However, this creates more problems. First, the modified "Return-Path" will be different from the "From" field, which violates the DMARC alignment requirement. As shown in Table 3 , P2 and P3 are still there for DMARC+SPF. In addition, if the user wants to reply the email, the modified "Return-Path" is no longer the original email sender, which breaks the communication.
Security Problems of DKIM
DKIM's security problems can also make legitimate emails to fail the authentication (P5). In addition, DKIM does not apply to non-email services by design (P6).
P5. Mailing List.
Recall that DKIM's signature is generated by signing the email header and content. Mailing lists will cause trouble because most mailing lists modify the email content before broadcasting it to the subscribers. The common modification is to add a "footer" with the mailing list's name and a link for un-subscription. Tempering the email content will cause DKIM failure.
P6. Non-Email domains.
DKIM does not apply to nonemail domain. P6 is based on the design of DKIM, not derived from the IETF discussion threads. We list P6 in Table 3 for completeness. For example, office.com hosts the website for Microsoft's Office software, but it is not an email domain (no MX server). Even so, attackers can still spoof help@office.com to phish Microsoft Office users. The domain owner of office.com needs to publish an SPF and DMARC record to prevent this domain from being spoofed.
Security Problems of DMARC
As shown in Table 3 , DMARC helps to solve some of the usability and security problems of SPF and DKIM. However, when a domain adopts DMARC, it may not have both SPF and DKIM in place. So problem P2, P3, and P5 may still exist. Failures of SPF and DKIM will cause DMARC to fail. This explains why DMARC tends to use relaxed failing policies, which is to avoid accidentally rejecting legitimate emails.
Even if a domain sets up all three protocols, the mailing list is still a big problem. For mailing lists, DMARC+SPF will be sure to fail -if the "Return-Path" is modified, DMARC will fail due to the misalignment of identifiers; if the "ReturnPath" is unmodified, SPF will fail due to the IP mismatch. For DMARC+DKIM, the situation is better as long as the mailing list does not temper the email content. However, in practice, mailing lists are obligated to inform users of the mailing list's name and ways to unsubscribe. This problem is under active discussions within the IETF working group [21] .
Validation and Summary
To validate P1-P6, we deployed SPF, DKIM and DMARC on our own mail servers to run proof-of-concept experiments. For SPF and DKIM, attackers can exploit the identifier alignment problem to fool users (using the "From" field) while still bypassing the authentication checks. Meanwhile, both protocols have challenges to handle common email scenarios such as mail forwarding and mailing lists. The new DMARC protocol can mitigate some of the usability problems, but other technical challenges remain (e.g., mailing list). These technical For email domains, the cost and benefit changes as more domains adopt the protocol. For non-email domains, the cost and benefit stay constant.
limitation could affect the perceived usefulness and perceived ease-of-use of these protocols. In the next step, we further validate our observations by conducting interviews and examine the perceived values and flaws of SPF, DKIM and DMARC from protocol adopters' perspectives.
RESULT: INTERVIEW
Our interviews have focused on questions regarding the adoption of SPF, DKIM and DMARC. Before the interview, we make it clear that interviewees don't need to disclose specific details about the email services that they manage. Even though we only interviewed two email administrators, their responses are quite consistent. They have acknowledged the technical limitations of SPF, DKIM and DMARC, and more importantly, pointed out the non-technical challenges for their adoption. In the following, we refer the campus-level email admin as U1 and the department-level admin as U2. We process the interview transcripts in a round of open coding, where the data is conceptualized and coded. Then we extract 4 high-level themes regarding why people are hesitated to adopt anti-spoofing protocols.
Theme 1: A Lack of Critical Mass
Both U1 and U2 mentioned that there had not been a global consensus that SPF, DKIM or DMARC should be the ultimate solution to stop spoofing. Part of the reason is these protocols are struggling to support common email scenarios such as mail forwarding (U1), and the perceived usefulness is not high enough. Potential adopters might be are waiting to see whether enough people would eventually get on board.
"U2: It is not the final answer that the industry picked up yet. I felt at this point that enough people haven't really adopted it, it's not worth for me to set it up."
This reflects a typical bootstrapping challenge, where a "critical mass" is needed in order to facilitate a self-sustaining adoption process [33] .
Theme 2: Benefits Not Overweight Costs
U1 and U2 also discussed the deeper reasons of the lack of critical mass. More specifically, the protocol adopter does not directly benefit from publishing their SPF, DKIM or DMARC records to the DNS. In fact, the published DNS records are primarily helping other email services to verify incoming emails and protecting the customers (users) of other email services.
For domains that publish the DNS records, the benefits are relatively small. "U2: You are relying on everyone else setting it up." Figure 5 illustrates the cost and benefit trade-off. We follow the Ozment-Schechter model [33] with specific justifications for email spoofing protocols. We also build separated models for email domains and non-email domains.
For email domains ( Figure 5(a) ), when more domains publish their SPF, DKIM or DMARC records, the benefits for each adopter will increase because more incoming emails can be authenticated. Regarding the costs, there will be a constant base cost for deploying the protocol. On top of that, early adopters also need to handle the insecure domains that have not adopted the protocol and those with misconfigurations.
The cost of insecure domains will drop as more domains adopt the protocol. However, this cost cannot reach zero due to the technical issues in protocol design (Table 3 ).
Figure 5(b) shows a bigger challenge to motivate non-email domains to publish the SPF/DMARC record. For non-email domains (e.g., office.com), publishing SPF/DMARC records is primarily helping other email services to detect spoofing (i.e. being a good "citizen"). The non-email domains themselves do not receive real benefits other than a better reputation.
Overall, the cost and benefit model is not in favor of creating a "critical mass" for a wide adoption. The bootstrapping phase is challenging without external enforcement or incentives.
Theme 3: Deployment Difficulties in Practice
Even if an email administrator decided to deploy the protocol, there would be other challenges in the way. For example, certain services do not have a control over their DNS record. Publishing SPF/DKIM/DMARC record will incur additional overhead to coordinate with their DNS providers (U1 and U2).
"U1: So we have very limited control over our DNS. Right now, it is just the difficulty of setting up that DNS."
Another challenge is that companies and organizations may not maintain their own mail servers, but rely on cloud-based email services. It is not their decision to deploy the anti-spoofing protocol if the protocol is not supported by the cloud email service (U1).
Theme 4: Risks of Breaking the Existing System
U2 also discussed the concerns of breaking the existing email system due to unfamiliarity to the protocol. This is particularly true for DMARC (published in 2015). Email providers need to go through careful testing to make sure the protocol does not block legitimate incoming emails, and their own emails are not blocked by others.
"U2: Probably because it (DMARC) is still in a testing phase and (people) want to see if it is going to work for them. Relatively it (DMARC) is still pretty new for big businesses and such."
U1 and U2 both mentioned that in general there was no penalty to domains for not publishing an SPF/DKIM/DMARC record. Their emails are typically not discriminated, unless other malicious signals are detected.
DISCUSSION
So far, we have described the key challenges for SPF, DKIM and DMARC to receive a wide adoption. Next, we discuss the implications of these challenges to future protocol design and possible solutions moving toward.
Improving the Perceived Usefulness.
The security and usability issues in SPF, DKIM and DMARC negatively impact their perceived usefulness, which is a determining factor for the protocol adoption (TAM [43] ). Using all 3 protocols helps to mitigate some of the problems, but not all of them (e.g., the "mailing list" issue still persists).
To improve the perceived usefulness, addressing these security and usability issues becomes the first priority. Currently, an IETF group is working on a new protocol called Authenticated Received Chain (ARC) [21] which is expected to address the mailing list problem of DMARC. However, this also adds to the number of protocols that domain owners need to deploy. New protocols will have their own challenges to be accepted. For example, the DMARC protocol, even though incrementally deployable, only achieved a 3.1% adoption rate in the past two years. To this end, it is not clear if creating another brand new protocol is the best solution.
Building the Critical Mass.
Currently, there is a lack of strong consensus to deploy anti-spoofing protocols. For email services, they are motivated to perform the authentication check to protect their own users, but are not as motivated to publish SPF/DKIM/DMARC records to help other email services. For non-email services, the incentives are even weaker. As illustrated in Figure 5 (a), only after enough domains adopted anti-spoofing protocols can these protocols produce real benefits. This lead to a bootstrapping problem.
To bootstrap the adoption and establish a critical mass, external mechanisms are often needed. In theory, we can adjust the rewarding function to provide more benefits to early adopters to create a positive net effect [33] . In addition, policymakers or major email providers may consider enforcing certain (sensitive) domains to publish their SPF/DKIM/DMARC records. The question is how to realize these ideas in practice without disrupting the operation of the current email system. This requires further research efforts and careful experimentations.
LIMITATIONS
Our study has several limitations. First, the scale of the study (particularly the interview) is very small. This limits us from producing any statistically significant results. We argue that our contribution is to provide a "qualitative" understanding of the problem space, which lays the ground work for future quantitative research. For example, one future direction is to conduct surveys to understand what types of domains are more likely to adopt anti-spoofing protocols, and how domain attributes (e.g., service type, popularity, sensitivity) affect the domain owners' decision. Second, our coding method for the IETF dataset requires significant manual efforts, which is not ideal. There is a possibility that advanced text mining tools (beyond LDA) can help to make this process more manageable.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we examine why email spoofing is (still) possible in today's email system. First, our measurement results confirm that anti-spoofing protocols (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) are not widely accepted. Then we qualitatively study the possible reasons of the low adoption rates. By analyzing the discussion threads in IETF and interviewing email administrators, we provide a deeper understanding of the perceived value and limitations of anti-spoofing protocols. Our results show that key security and usability limitations are rooted in the protocol design which hurts the perceived usefulness of these protocols. This also makes it difficult to establish a "critical mass" to facilitate a positive net effect for a wider adoption. Moving forward, extensive efforts are needed to address the technical issues in the protocol design, and develop external enforcement (or incentives) to bootstrap the protocol adoption.
